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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter as
provided by 78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Appeals from district court involving domestic cases,
including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption
and paternity.

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH

RITA B. GUM,
Plaintiff and Appellant

Court of Appeals
No. 90-0528-CA

vs.
JAMES RICHARD GUM,

Priority Classification
No. 16

Defendant and Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff appealed from a final Decree of Divorce entered in
the Third District Court, State of Utah, on the 10th day of
September, 1990.

No cross-appeal was filed.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
I.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, WILL A REVIEWING COURT

ON APPEAL SET ASIDE OR MODIFY A FINAL CONSENT JUDGMENT (DIVORCE
DECREE)?
Standard of Review:

A matter is not reviewable unless it is

properly raised in the trial court. See Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d
96 (Utah 1986); Burnham v. Burnham. 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986);

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978); Baker v.
Baker. 551 P. 2d 1263 (Utah 1976); Riter v, Cavias; 431 P. 2d 784
(Utah 1967).
In the trial court the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable.

The trial court may set

aside a decree or modify the same on any of the grounds found in
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon finding
the evidence in support thereof, the attack could include mistake,
fraud, undue influence, coercion, material misrepresentation.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore
denominated
intrinsic
or
extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action
has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to
appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4),
not more than 3 months after the judgment, order> or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
2

proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules
or by an independent action.
See also Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah 1975); Klein v.
Klein. 511 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1973).
II.

MAY JUDICIAL BIAS BE RAISED AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL IF NOT

RAISED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL?

DOES THE RECORD SHOW JUDICIAL

BIAS?
Standard of Review;

If the matter is not raised as an issue

at the trial court level, it is not reviewable.

See Paffel v.

Paffel, supra; Burnham v. Burnham, supra; Aroyle v. Aroyle, 688
P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, supra?

Baker v.

Baker, supra; Riter v. Cayias, supra.
If judicial bias is properly raised as an issue in the trial
court, that court should look to the provisions of Rule 63(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and make appropriate findings
thereon.
Rule 63. Disability or Disqualification of a Judge.
(b) Disqualification.
Whenever a party to any
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney
shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
has a bias or prejudice, either against such party or his
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the suit,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to
call in another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice
3

exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is
known*
If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of the
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit. If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is
certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another
judge must be called in to try the case or determine the
matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any
case to file more than one affidavit; and no such
affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a
certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and
application are made in good faith.
III.

ARE THE FINDINGS OF FACT ON MATERIAL ISSUES RESERVED FOR

TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH AND SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT
(DECREE)?
Standard

of Review;

The court must

apply

the

clearly

erroneous test as to material issues tried at the trial court
level.

See Beraer v. Beraer. 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985); Graff v.

Graff 699 P. 2d 765 (Utah 1985); Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P. 2d 760
(Utah 1985).
This requirement is set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specifically and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
4

the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of
a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall
be considered as the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court following
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial
court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of
law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when
the motion is based on more than one ground.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The instant action came before the trial court after numerous
court proceedings and extensive discovery. During all the previous
proceedings Plaintiff was represented by counsel but finally
appeared pro se at the trial.

Prior to trial Plaintiff's counsel

withdrew and Plaintiff filed a supplement to her complaint which
she entitled "Supplement to Complaint and Partial Response to
Defendant's Counter Offer of July 25, 1990". (Record 173).
By way of Plaintiff's filing the Supplement to her complaint,
she indicated her desire to represent herself and stated therein
her requested disposition of the issues. Plaintiff's counsel had
withdrawn July 30, 1990, with leave of court.

(Record 164 - 165).

Notice to Appoint Successor Counsel was filed August 1, 1990.
(Record 171). Plaintiff's Supplement to her complaint was filed on
5

the 13th of August, 1990.

(Record 173).

Upon appearance at trial, the court invited Plaintiff and
Defendant's
conference.
176).

counsel

to

review

the

matter

in

an

in-chambers

See Minute Entry dated September 6, 1990.

(Record

After lengthy review with the court, Defendant was also

called to participate in the discussions and a full and complete
settlement was reached on all of the issues.
in the in-chambers conference.

There was no record

The parties and the court then

convened in open court and upon the record.

Certain matters for

clarification purposes on specific items were read into the record
and agreed to by the parties in open court and on the record.

The

parties confirmed on the record that they understood and accepted
the terms of the agreement reached in chambers and their agreement
was acknowledged on the record in open court.

(Tr. p. 62, lines 5

-17).
The court requested that Defendant's counsel prepare findings,
conclusions

and

a

proposed

decree

reflecting

tjie parties'

agreement. Defendant's counsel requested the same be reviewed with
Plaintiff before the court so that if questions arose they could be
resolved before the court.
1 - 17).

(Tr. p. 67, lines 19 - 25; p 68, lines

The findings, conclusions and proposed decree were

prepared and made available to Plaintiff in advance and were then
subsequently reviewed in court as scheduled on the 10th day of
6

September, 1990. The review with the Plaintiff and the court and
Defendant's counsel was in full and in detail.

Two changes were

made by interlineation to reflect a mutual decree rather than the
decree being awarded just to Defendant.

(See Conclusions of Law,

paragraph 1 at Record 197, and Decree of Divorce paragraph 1,
Record 201).
decree.

Plaintiff approved the findings, conclusions and

Defendant approved the same through counsel.

The court

approved the same and they were entered by the court signing in
front of Plaintiff and defendant's counsel at that time.
Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal with the trial court on
the 4th day of October, 1990. (Record 207 - 209). Plaintiff seeks
to set aside the decree and/or to modify it in several respects
(alimony, property distribution, child support, fees and costs) and
raises a question of judicial bias.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant, James R. Gum, purchased a home in 1970 with

his first wife who passed away during their marriage making him a
widower. His first marriage lasted in excess of twenty seven (27)
years before her death.

Plaintiff and Defendant married on the

24th day of March, 1982 (Record 2, par. 2); it being a second
marriage of Defendant and a third marriage of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's former marriages ended in divorce.
very

stormy

relationship.

They were
7

Both of

The parties had a

separated

on

numerous

occasions and filed three divorce actions against one another; one
of which lay dormant for some time and then was amended.

Those

actions were filed March 26, 1987, amended October 12, 1988; a
second action October 31, 1988; and the instant action on the 8th
day of March, 1990.

The parties ceased living together entirely

after the filing of the third complaint.
2.
the

Plaintiff was represented by counsel in each action. In

instant

action by

Delbert Welker, succeeded

Spafford, who withdrew on the 31st day of July, 1990.
- 165). Plaintiff then

by Earl S.
(Record 162

represented herself, making known that

desire, and filing her supplement to her complaint on the 13th day
of August, 1990.

(Record 173).

The case was scheduled for trial

on the 6th day of September, 1990.
3.

Plaintiff

had

four

(Record 174).

children

by

one

of

her

former

marriages, all of which children were adopted by Defendant.

Two

were minors at the time of trial, Amy, born March 14, 1975, now 16
years of age; and Joy, born September 22, 1976, now 14 1/2 years of
age.
4.

Pursuant to the court's order entered at a hearing on the

11th day of July, 1990, concerning Plaintiff's failure to abide by
the previous orders of the court by not vacating the home, the
court entered an order requiring the home to be sold and the net
funds held for disposition at the time of trial.
8

(Tr. p. 42, lines

6 - 25; p. 43 - 47, to line 8).

Pursuant to that order, the home

was sold August 24, 1990 and proceeds of $10,202.00 were available
with the escrow agent at the time of trial.

(Record 191, par. 5;

Addendum to Plaintiff's Brief at A-64).
5.

Defendant had retired

from his employment

at Union

Pacific Railroad in 1988 after having open heart surgery with a
triple by-pass the previous year. Defendant is a serious diabetic
and must receive insulin.

(Record 180, par. 8)

Plaintiff had

previous work experience as a teacher and secretarial experience
and was employed at the time of trial at the Hilton Hotel, earning
$563.00 per month.
6.

(Record 191 - 192, par. 8).

At the time Plaintiff vacated the home just prior to sale

in August, 1990, Plaintiff removed from the home almost all of the
parties' personal property

items which were located therein,

including Defendant's premarital items.

A list of those items was

annexed as Exhibit A to Defendant's Trial Brief.

(Record 178 -

187).
7.

Plaintiff in her original Verified Complaint requested

$1.00 per year alimony.

(Record 4) Plaintiff in her Supplement to

Complaint requested that no alimony be awarded to either party;
that the proceeds of the sale of the home be divided between the
parties as the court would determine; that support be provided for
the children in accordance with the guidelines; that any other
9

matters in dispute be resolved by the court.
for fees or costs.
8.

No request was made

(Record 173).

Plaintiff's Supplement to her Complaint was entitled in

part "Response to Defendant's Counter Offer of July 25, 1990".
(Record 173) The July 25, 1990 counter offer is incorporated in a
letter to Plaintiff's then counsel, Mr. Earl S. Spafford and is
shown in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief at A-48. The Supplement
to Complaint and Counter Offer of July 25, 1990, referred to herein
was available to the court and became the starting point for the
in-chambers discussion of the court on the day of trial, September
6, 1990, resulting in a complete settlement.
9.

When the findings, conclusions and decree were prepared,

the findings recited the agreement of the parties and stated in
language

to

convey

that

understanding

"the

parties

agreed".

(Record 189 - 196)
10.

The following findings are those attacked either by

specific number or in substance by Plaintiff in her appeal, and in
each instance the finding reflects that the parties agreed:
Finding #13:
The parties have agreed to share copies of a picture
album. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding #14 reads:
The parties agreed that the Plaintiff would be paid the
sum of $3,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of the
home upon the date of entry of the decree provided
10

Plaintiff has returned the Llardro, the hunting rifle,
the sword and the binoculars; and that except for the
personal items of property identified which have been
divided between the parties, all other property of the
Defendant would remain as his sole and separate property,
including his pension, savings and benefit plans and all
personal property in his possession. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding #15 reads:
The parties agreed that no alimony would be awarded to
either party. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding #16 reads:
The parties agreed that the support for the minor
children would be in accordance with the Uniform Child
Support Schedules and that there is no reason for the
court to deviate therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding #17 reads:
The parties agreed that each would pay
respective attorney's fees and costs.
supplied)

for their
(Emphasis

(Record 194, paragraph 13 through 195 paragraph 17.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

A reviewing court will not set aside or modify a consent

decree in the absence of showing fraud, undue influence, coercion,
mistake of a material fact, misrepresentation of a material fact or
showing that the consent was not actually given.
The factual determination of matters are for the trial court
in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and are not reviewable if not raised at the trial level, supra.
II.

It is clear that consent was given by the parties and a
11

settlement was reached and confirmed by the court.
It is clear from the record that Plaintiff had agreed to the
terms of the settlement (Tr. p. 62, lines 5 - 17), and agreed to
the findings of fact as they were entered by making affirmation,
approval and acceptance of the same before the court at the time of
entry September 10, 1990.
III.

Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden to marshal the

evidence and the facts from the record bearing on her request that
the decree be set aside or modified.
Procedurally a petition to modify must first be brought at the
trial court

level.

Procedure, supra.

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Plaintiff does not claim that the findings,

conclusions or decree were procured or entered through fraud,
misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence, or that there was
a mistake of a material fact.
IV.

It is clear there was an agreement confirmed by the

parties and the court.
Plaintiff consented and agreed on the record and in writing to
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
V.

Plaintiff's claim of judicial bias is without merit.

Plaintiff has claimed judicial bias, raising her claim for the
first time at the appellate level.

She has failed to meet the

requirements of Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduref
12

supra.

Judicial bias cannot be reviewed if not claimed at the

trial court level.
VI.

The Findings of Fact are consistent with and sufficient

to support the judgment of the court.
Plaintiff seeks relief in the Court of Appeals attacking
specific findings as being insufficient to support the decree or to
allow an appropriate analysis of the findings.

Plaintiff has

failed to marshal the evidence from the record and has failed to
meet the clearly erroneous test of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, supra.
VII.

There is ample evidence in the record to show the

reasonableness of the property division.
Plaintiff claims error in not awarding permanent alimony and
seeks a modification of the property distribution.

Both of these

claims were removed from issue and dispute by the consent and
agreement of the parties in their settlement, confirmed by each and
the court.

These matters are not reviewable.

A modification

petition should first have been pursued at the trial court level,
and then under appropriate circumstances the appellate court could
review the trial court's determination.

Plaintiff has not and

cannot meet the clearly erroneous test of Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, with respect to the substance of
her claims regarding alimony or the property division.
13

VIII.

Plaintiff offers no theory for review or relief on her

claim against the "quick sale" of the house.

The matter is not

reviewable.
Plaintiff now, at the appellate level, complains of the "quick
sale".

Both parties participated in and accomplished the "quick

sale", and there is no judicial remedy remaining.

That matter was

not pursued at the trial court level and is not reviewable.
IX.

Ancillary matters

A.

Plaintiff's

claim

that

the

findings

of

fact

are

insufficient regarding child support is without merit.
B.

Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not

awarding fees and costs is without merit.
C.

Plaintiff's complaint of the existence of a clerical

error does not give rise to an appellate issue.
D.

Plaintiff's claim for lost child support owed by a former

husband is without merit.
E.

Plaintiff's claim that the decree should be set aside as

a mutual decree and requesting that the decree be awarded to her on
the grounds of cruelty is without merit.
ARGUMENT
I.

MATTERS RAISED BY PLAINTIFF ARE NOT REVIEWABLE.

The questions raised by Plaintiff in her appeal are not
totally

compatible

and

consistent
14

with

the

relief

she

has

requested. An examination should first be made as to the nature of
the matters she assigns as error. Plaintiff has alluded to six (6)
specific errors which in substance seek to have the Appellate Court
set aside or modify the decree. Two additional claims of error can
be discerned, one pertaining to Plaintiff's complaint of the "quick
sale" of Defendant's premarital home and one complaining judicial
bias.
Plaintiff's requests to the appellate court for orders may be
enumerated as follows:
(1) Vacating the mutual decree which was awarded on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, modifying it and awarding it
to her on the grounds of cruelty.
(2) Modifying the child support.
(3) Modifying the decree and awarding permanent alimony.
(4) Modifying the decree and redistributing property.
(5) Modifying the decree awarding costs and attorneys
fees through the time of trial and on appeal.
(6) Modifying the decree awarding Plaintiff an interest
in Defendant's retirement plan.
(7) Ruling that the "quick sale" was improper.
(8) Ruling that there was judicial bias.
The threshold question here is whether a reviewing court will
set aside or modify a final consent judgment, and if so, under what
15

circumstances. The analysis begins with determining whether there
is an appealable issue and whether an appropriate effort has been
made to set aside or modify the decree at the trial court level.
If a timely and appropriate motion is made# the trial court
must look to the provisions as expressed in Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra.
ruling

on

the

motion,

the

Then if the trial court errs in

appellate

court

may

review

the

deliberation and make appropriate disposition which could include
setting aside or modifying the decree.
If an appellate court were to vacate a consent decree, it
would be performing the task of a trial court, which is the trier
of fact, and would be acting in an arbitrary and capricious fashion
by not allowing the opposing party to marshal the facts in support
of the findings and decree.

To set aside a decree, whether it be

a consent decree or otherwise, is a matter for the trial court in
accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
supra. Until the trial court has acted upon a proper motion, there
is no appealable issue.
If an appellate court should become inclined to review the
facts and circumstances behind a consent judgment or to remand it
to the trial court for specific findings under strict standards (as
if the issue had been tried on the evidence), then a significant
chilling

effect

would

inhibit
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litigants

and

attorneys

from

negotiating and settling disputes short of a full trial on the
merits and on the record.

Under such a scenario, the positive

efforts of the legal system to encourage settlement would be
negated and of no avail and the respect for and the inviolability
of the legal system would be in decline.
II.

IT IS CLEAR FROM THE RECORD THAT THE PARTIES SETTLED ALL

ISSUES.
Where the parties stipulate and settle disputed issues, the
issues upon which they agree are removed from the litigation as
contested issues and require no further determination by the court.
They no longer are issues where the parties have agreed they should
not be issues to be tried to a court.

The court in approving the

agreement of the parties, merely confirms the same after finding it
reasonable to do so. The court in confirming the settlement of the
parties must be presumed to have reviewed it for reasonableness.
The trial court in such circumstances, provided it finds the same
reasonable, should not be required to impose its views upon the
parties on matters not at issue and need not make detailed analysis
or lay down specific or general principles of that analysis. It is
superfluous to do so where the issue
case by settlement.

has been removed from the

Had the trial court in the instant action

not accepted or approved as reasonable the agreement of the
parties, it could be presumed that it would have required the
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parties to proceed with trial and the production of evidence so
that a final determination could be made by the court.
III. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE FROM THE RECORD TO SHOW THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
Plaintiff has the burden to marshal the evidence and the facts
from the record to show that the decree encompassing the parties'
agreement should be set aside, modified or amended.

(Procedurally

that must be done at the trial court level. Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra).

That burden has not been met by

Plaintiff.
The evidence which Plaintiff would be required to marshal and
to present at the trial court level to set aside the decree would
be

evidence

of

material

mistakes,

fraud,

misrepresentation, coercion, and/or undue influence.

material
Then in the

language of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduref supraf
"On motion and upon such terms as are just

" the court could

receive the evidence and make a determination.

Plaintiff has not

proceeded in the trial court; neither has she pointed to any
evidence

in

the

record

which

would

show

mistake,

material

misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, undue influence or any other
matters that would justify her requested relief.
not and cannot meet her burden.
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Plaintiff

has

IV.

IT IS CJLEAR THERE WAS AM AGREEMENT CONFIRMED BY THE

PARTIES AND THE COURT.
The

question

then

becomes

whether

the

parties

had

an

agreement, and if so, whether it will be as enforceable as other
agreements.

See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah 1975);

Klein v. Klein, 511 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1973).
In Klein v. Klein, 544 P. 2d 472, 475

(Utah 1975), the

appellant answered audibly before the court on the record that he
accepted the stipulation of the parties and understood the same.
The appellate court said that the same rules apply to binding the
parties to their consent and stipulation as apply to any other
agreements. Their agreement cannot be repudiated without reason or
justification.
In the instant action the Plaintiff does not claim any fraud,
undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake of a material fact or
anything else that would allow her to repudiate her agreement which
she confirmed in court on the record,

(Tr. p. 62, lines 5 - 1 7 ) ,

and affirmed once again by approving the findings, conclusions and
decree before the court on the date the decree was signed and
entered.
As indicated

in Klein v. Klein, Id. the

power

of a

trial

court to render a judgment by consent of the parties is dependent
upon the existence of the consent at the time the agreement
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receives the sanction of the court.
In the instant case that is precisely what was done. Consent
was given after a thorough review of all the language of the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree before the court
and then signed by the court in the very presence of the Plaintiff
and counsel for Defendant.
V.

NO ISSUE OF JUDICIAL BIAS HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED.

The appellate court will not review a claim of judicial bias
raised for the first time at the appellate level.
Matters of judicial bias are governed by the provisions,
requirements and procedures of Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, supra.

Plaintiff has made no showing whatsoever

that she raised the issue of judicial bias at the trial level.
Neither has Plaintiff pointed to any substantive showing in the
record of any judicial bias.
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supra.
contemplates that as soon as a party believes there is a bias, that
party has the burden to make that known to the court in affidavit
form and in good faith.

The rule also contemplates that a

determination of the claim of bias would be made from the evidence;
all of which must happen at the trial level.

A claim of judicial

bias against a trial judge, as in other matters, cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. See Paffel v. Paffel. supra; Burnham
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v, Burnham, supra; Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, supra: Baker v. Baker,
supra; Riter v. Cayias, supra.
VI.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH AND SUFFICIENT

TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT.
Even if the Appellate Court determined that Plaintiff somehow
had raised matters appropriately in the trial court to modify or
set aside the decree, which had then been rejected by the trial
court, the clearly erroneous test as required by Rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, would apply.
The party attacking the findings has the burden to marshal the
evidence and the facts from the record to show that the findings
are clearly erroneous when viewed in the light most favorable to
the other party.

Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1987);

Burnham v. Burnham, supra; Graff v, Graff, supra; Bushel v. Bushelf
649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982); Stuki v. Stuki, 562 P.2d 240 (Utah 1977);
Baker v. Baker, supra; Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975);
Mitchell v, Mitchell, 527 P. 2d 1359

(Utah 1974); Haumont v.

Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990); Cook v. Cook, 739 P.2d 90
(Utah App. 1987); Tallev v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987),
The trial court must be given broad latitude and significant
deference in its findings of fact even where they are findings
pertaining to material issues that were tried on the evidence to
the court. Burnham v. Burnham, supra; Argvle v. Argvle, supra;
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Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980); Baker v. Bakerf
supra; Hansen v. Hansen, supra; Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra; Searle
v. Searle. 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); Whitehead v. Whitehead. 397
P.2d 987 (Utah 1965);

Cook v. Cook, supra.

In the instant case the issues Plaintiff wishes to address
were removed from the litigation by the litigants in a complete
settlement.

Since the decree of the court is based upon the

consent and agreement of the parties, the standard of review must
be entirely different than if the facts were tried to the court
upon the evidence.

The appellate court is unable to conduct any

review of matters that were not at issue in the trial court.

In

the instant case issues of alimony, property distribution, fees and
costs, and child support were all removed from dispute by the
litigants in their settlement.

See Despain v. Despain. supra;

Klein v. Klein. 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975).
It is clear that the appellate court can review both law and
facts in domestic cases involving divorce, but the appellate court
reviews the trial court's determination with the presumption that
it is correct and the burden is on the one attacking the trial
court's determination to show that the trial court's findings are
clearly erroneous. Beraer v. Beraer. supra; Bonwich v. Bonwich.
supra; Graff v. Graff, supra. Searle v. Searle. supra; Mitchell v.
Mitchell, supra; Hansen v. Hansen, supra; Aroyle v. Aroyle. supra;
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Turner v. Turnerr 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982).
If Plaintiff had properly raised the issue of alimony at the
trial level then the clearly erroneous test would be applicable to
the trial court's findings. The principles set out in the case of
Jones v. Jones. 700 P. 2d, 1072 (Utah 1985) and the numerous cases
which have followed those principles would be looked to for
guidance.

See

Haumont v. Haumont, supra.

That analysis and

review cannot be done where alimony was not a material issue.
the instant action alimony was removed as an issue at the request
of Plaintiff in the filing of her Supplement to Complaint (Record
173); by her affirmance of the agreement in open court on the
record (Tr. p. 62, lines 2 - 17), and finally by Plaintiff's
affirming and approving the specific findings of fact which recited
the parties' agreement before the court on the 10th day of
September, 1990f the date of entry of decree.
If the court were to look strictly at the sufficiency of the
evidence, ignoring all procedural difficulties and appropriate
reviewable issues, Plaintiff should still fail in her attack.
It is Plaintiff's burden to marshal all the evidence in the
Record and Transcript bearing on the findings which she attacks.
Those matters must then be viewed in the light most favorable to
Defendant and found to be clearly erroneous before an appellate
court will disturb them.

A review of the specific findings
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In

attacked by Plaintiff will show that she has not and cannot meet
her burden:
FINDING

#11 of the findings of fact deal with personal

property items and is very specific as to the items in Plaintiff's
possession. (Record 193)
FINDING #12 deals with personal property items in Defendant's
possession and is very specific as to the same.

The only values

with respect to items of personal property were those shown in
Defendant's Exhibit to his Trial Brief.

(Record 184 - 187). Those

values were never disputed by Plaintiff.
FINDING #13 deals with the picture album and reflects that the
parties agreed on how to deal with it.

(Record 194).

FINDING #14 deals with the payment to Plaintiff of $3,000.00
from the sales proceeds of the premarital home of Defendant (Record
194), and specifically states that all other property, including
specifically Defendant's pension, savings and benefit plans and
personal property in his possession would remain as his sole and
separate property.

(Record 195).

The finding reflects by the use

of its language that the parties agreed thereto.

(Record 194).

FINDING #15 deals with alimony and reflects that the parties
agreed that there would be none to either party. (Record 193).
That agreement is consistent with Plaintiff's request in the
Supplement to Complaint

(Record 173).
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Admittedly the finding

regarding alimony does not go into an analysis as to the financial
circumstances of Plaintiff as set out in Jones v. Jones, supra.
However Plaintiff in her appeal does not specifically assign as
error that Finding #15 is defective.

Where a matter is not so

assigned, the reviewing court cannot review it.
Should this court desire to look at the substance of the
matters bearing on alimony considerations# there is ample evidence
in the record to show the parties' circumstances.

Those circum-

stances are as follows:
(1) Defendant retired after six (6) years of the marriage and
after having had heart surgery with a triple by-pass. Defendant is
a serious diabetic and receives insulin. Defendant was 59 years of
age on the date of trial, born the 5th day of January, 1931.
Through Defendant's pension and retirement programs he receives
$3,096.72 per month.

(Record 191) There is no lump sum available

to him.
(2)

Plaintiff

was

53 years of age at trial time, her

birthdate is January 20, 1937. Plaintiff was employed at the time
of trial at the Hilton Hotel, earning $563.00 per month.

(Record

190 - 192)
(3)

The parties married on the 24th day of March, 1982.

(Record 2).
(4) The parties had a stormy marriage, numerous separations,
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three divorce cases, one of which was amended, and lived together
not at all after the filing of the latest complaint.
(5)

(Record 178)

Defendant had one previous marriage which ended with his

wife's death after more than twenty seven (27) years of marriage
(Record 178).
(6)

Plaintiff had two former marriages, both of which ended

in divorce.
(7)

(Record 179).

The house on the avenues in Salt Lake was premarital

property of Defendant having been purchased with his first wife in
1970.

(Record 178 - 181). The remodeling of the avenues home came

from Defendant's premarital savings. Payments on the mortgage came
from Defendant's earnings and his retirement benefits since his
retirement in 1988.

(Record 181) (Tr. p. 4, lines 3 - 19).

Defendant testified that Plaintiff did not provide any money toward
the purchase, remodeling, payment or upkeep of the home.
4, lines 20 - 24).

(Tr. p.

Ample evidence is present in the record to

support the judgment of the court.
VII. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SHOW THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE PROPERTY DIVISION.
Plaintiff made no claim in her complaint against Defendant's
son's West Valley house that she now claims on appeal is a second
house belonging to the parties.

(Record 2 - 8).

Neither did

Plaintiff request any interest in what she now calls the second
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home in the Supplement to her Complaint.

(Record 173).

Plaintiff

now on appeal wishes to raise the so-called second home as an issue
and have the reviewing court make a factual determination regarding
it.
At a hearing under oath, Plaintiff was asked if she claimed
that any of her individual monies had gone into the purchase of the
West Valley home. She answered no. She was then asked a series of
questions; whether she made any of the payments, she answered no;
whether she had made any of the utility payments, her answer was
no; whether she paid any taxes on the home, her answer was no.
(Tr. p. 32, lines 4 - 1 4 ) .
Where an issue is properly presented to the court and tried on
the evidence, the appellate court will not disturb a property
distribution on appeal unless the court is satisfied that the
property distribution is unjust or constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion. Bettinaer v. Bettinaer. 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990);
Haumont v. Haumont, supra.

Clearly the trial court did not abuse

its discretion regarding Defendant's son's West Valley home or
other property.
With respect to the property division, it is clear that the
parties

removed

those

matters

as

issues

and

settled

their

differences and that settlement was approved by the parties and
given sanction by the court.

It is also clear on a review of the
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record that Plaintiff has not and cannot meet her burden to show
that the findings are clearly erroneous regarding the property
division. Beraer v. Beraer, supra; Graff v. Graff, supra; Bonvich
v. Bonwich? supra.
The parties were married only six years while Defendant was
accruing retirement benefits. Defendant's retirement benefits are
$3,095.00 per month. The home sale proceeds which were distributed
in part to Plaintiff represented premarital property. It cannot be
clearly inequitable to award Plaintiff an interest in one asset
rather than the other.
VIII. PLAINTIFF OFFERS MO THEORY FOR REVIEW OR RELIEF ON HER
CLAIH AGAINST THE "QUICK SALE" OF TBOS HOUSE.

THE MATTER IS NOT

REVIEWABLE.
Plaintiff's claim that the court erred in ordering a quick
sale of the parties7 home is moot and meaningless.

No remedy or

relief can be designed by the appellate court.
Even if we agree that the act of the court in requiring the
home to be sold was an unwise act, the damage if any, was shared by
the parties. Any harm or damage was more unfavorable to Defendant
than to Plaintiff because the home represented his primary asset
and premarital property.
Defendant also can offer no theory to the reviewing court for
a correction of that matter.

It is now an accomplished fact and
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there has been acquiescence by each of the parties who have divided
the proceeds in accordance with their agreement.
IX.

ANCILLARY MATTERS.

A.

Plaintiff's

claim

that

the

findings

of

fact

are

insufficient regarding child support is without merit.
Plaintiff's claim that the findings of fact are insufficient
with respect to determining child support is totally without merit
as can be determined by a review of those findings.

(Record 191 -

para. 7 & 8, Record 192 balance of paragraph 8 and paragraph 9).
B.

Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not

awarding fees and costs is without merit.
Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not awarding
her fees and costs rests on the same foundation or lack thereof as
the primary portion of her attack and must fall for the same
reasons. She did not request fees in the Supplement to Complaint.
(Record 173).

Plaintiff presented no evidence and did not reserve

fees and costs as an issue to be tried.
evidence

of

amount

of

fees

and

Plaintiff did not put on

costs

or

the

necessity

or

reasonableness. See Talley v. Talley. supra; Delatore v. Delatore,
680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984).

Plaintiff agreed that each party

would pay their separate costs and fees as reflected in the
findings confirmed by her audibly on the record.

(Tr. p. 62, lines

5 - 1 7 ) and confirmed by her once again by approving the findings
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of fact, conclusions of law and decree on the date of entry before
the court.
C

Plaintiff's complaint of a harmless clerical error does

not rise to a level to entitle her to relief.
Plaintiff complains of a clerical error which is harmless
error under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and may be
corrected in accordance with Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a). Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments,
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the
court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such
mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the
appellate court.
Rule 61.
Harmless error.
No error in either the
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Plaintiff has raised a question regarding what appears clearly
as a clerical error but has not sought relief therefrom. The error
is typographical or clerical, picked up from a pre-programmed
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letterhead. While it is not clear from the appellant's brief what
her claims are regarding that matter, counsel feels compelled to
respond.

The computer program

or the person

preparing the

pleadings typed, in the caption, that Defendant's counsel was
attorney for Plaintiff.

In each instance the pleading was clearly

signed by counsel as Attorney for Defendant, not Plaintiff. There
was never any confusion by either party or the court as to present
counsel for Defendant assuming any representation for Plaintiff.
None has been demonstrated by Plaintiff; none could honestly be
demonstrated.

It was harmless error, subject to correction in

accordance with Rule 60(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
supra.

Counsel requests the correction be made

and become

effective for all pleadings in the case.
D.

Plaintiff's claim for lost child support owed by a former

husband is without merit.
plaintiff has raised a question regarding the sufficiency of
the findings of fact with respect to child support.

However, in

Plaintiff's argument she asserts that she is somehow entitled to be
compensated for lost back child support owed by the children's
natural father prior to adoption by Defendant.

There is no

evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff made that request
prior to the appellate level.
E.

It is entirely without merit.

Plaintiff's claim that the decree should be set aside as
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a mutual decree and requesting that the decree be awarded to her on
the grounds of cruelty is without merit.

See Haumont v. Haumontr

supra«
If there had been any basis to set the decree aside, Plaintiff
should have pursued her claim through the trial court in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, supra.

However, with respect to the substance of her

thrust regarding grounds, it can be noted that the only evidence
which Plaintiff can marshal and present before the reviewing court
on that issue is found at Tr. p. 64, lines 4 - 1 8 ) where Defendant
was called to testify regarding grounds.
Q.
You have alleged in your counterclaim, and she
alleged in her complaint, certain differences between you
that have become irreconcilable. Would you tell the
court what you feel is irreconcilable about this
marriage, briefly?
A.
Yes, we were constantly fighting throughout the
marriage for a period of more than six years, and it just
became unbearable for both of us.
Q.

Do you desire that this marriage be terminated?

A.

Yes, do I. [sic]

Q.
Do you think the differences between the two of you
are irreconcilable?
A.

Yes, I do.

Plaintiff did not take the stand to testify regarding any
grounds.

There is no evidence controverting the grounds to which

Defendant testified.

Under the evidence presented, it is clear
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that the court had the power to grant the decree on the basis of
irreconcilable differences consistent with the provision of Rule
30-3-1(3)(h) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
30-3-1

Procedure - Residence - Grounds

(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and
conducted as provided by law for proceedings
in civil causes, except as provided in this
chapter.
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the
marriage contract between the plaintiff and
defendant on the grounds specified in
Subsection (3)
(3) Grounds for Divorce:
(h)

Irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
CONCLUSION

Appellee respectfully requests the court of appeals to affirm
the decree in all its particulars, awarding no costs or fees to
appellant.
I.

Plaintiff has failed entirely to raise an appealable

issue and her claims are frivolous.
II.

Plaintiff's claim of judicial bias is untimely and

totally without merit.
III. Plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence to support her
claims of abuse of discretion or her claim that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous.
IV.

The

Record

and

Transcript
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show

the

findings

were

consistent with and adequate to support the consent decree.
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